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A Case against Representationalism
The case of blurry vision has been cited by many as a counterexample to 
representationalism in the theory of perception.1 Specifically, it is claimed 
that the phenomenon of blurry vision is incompatible with the supervenience 
thesis which is at the root of representationalism. Michael Tye (2002), a 
leading representationalist, has responded to such objections by giving an 
account of blurry vision in a way that, allegedly, renders it compatible with 
representationalism. In this paper I argue that Tye’s account of blurry vision, 
though blocking one line of objection, cannot save representationalism. I 
then assimilate cases of blurry vision as well as similar cases to the more 
general category of indeterminate experiences. 
1. Representationalism and Blurry Vision
Representationalism, or intentionalism, is the view that visual experiences, 
much like beliefs and thoughts, are mental representations: they are 
content-laden mental states that can be either correct (veridical) or incorrect 
(non-veridical). Besides having representational properties, which are the 
properties visual experience represents an object as having, experiences also 
have phenomenal properties, or phenomenal character. The phenomenal 
character of experience is “what it is like” to have the experience, or its 
“immediate subjective feel” (Tye 2002, 137). Representationalism differs 
from other theories of perception – specifically theories that assert the 
existence of qualia – in that it asserts the supervenience of the phenomenal 
properties of experience on representational properties.
The supervenience thesis (henceforth ST) is that any difference in the 
phenomenal character of experience necessarily entails a difference in 
the representational content of that experience. The minimal version of 
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1 See, e.g., Boghossian & Velleman (1989), Pace (2007), Schroer (2002), Smith 
(2008), Tye (2002).
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representationalism involves a commitment to ST: ST expresses the idea 
that the representational content of experience determines its phenomenal 
character. Stronger theories of representationalism – such as Tye’s – are 
committed to more than ST. However, I will not go into such stronger 
theories here, since, as I will show, a clear picture of the phenomenon of 
blurry vision is sufficient to show that ST is false, which in turn is sufficient 
to undermine representationalism.
Some stronger versions of representationalism, for instance, are committed 
to the thesis of transparency.2 According to the transparency thesis, when 
you turn your attention to intrinsic features of your visual experience, you 
will find only external features, only the representational features of your 
experience – namely, how the world is according to your experience. Recently, 
A. D. Smith (2008, 208ff.) showed that the transparency thesis requires a 
kind of determination of phenomenal character by representational content 
which is stronger than ST suggests. I think Smith is right. Thus, at least for 
the reasons Smith mentions, ST is more basic for representationalism than 
transparency. If ST itself is wrong, representationalism is in big trouble.
What is it about the phenomenon of blurry vision that is meant to pose 
a problem for representationalism? The claim is as follows: a blurred 
experience of objects (as when one temporarily unfocuses one’s eyes) 
cannot be fully described in terms of representational content alone, for 
even the fullest description of what such experience represents still ignores 
its unique phenomenal character, namely, the fact that it is blurred. Thus 
there are phenomenological features of the blurred experience that outstrip 
what is represented in it. Paul Boghossian and David Velleman (1989, 94), 
for instance, argue that a description of a blurred experience has to include 
reference to areas in the visual field that are nonrepresentational or pure 
phenomenal aspects of experience. In general, then, blurred vision suggests 
that there are special ways in which we experience objects which cannot be 
captured in terms of representational content.
On the face of it, a distinction should be drawn between blurred experience 
and another, similar form of experience. We sometimes see objects as being 
blurry or fuzzy. The fuzziness in such a case is a property that visual experience 
represents an object as having. The term “blurry” or “fuzzy” in this case does 
2 Harman (1990), Tye (2002). Kind (2003, 203) goes deeper into explaining 
transparency; in particular, she differentiates between strong and weak transparency.
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not denote any special way of experiencing objects. One can even clearly 
experience, say, a paint blot as being fuzzy. Such experience is in no special 
way different from any other, clear experience, and is by itself no threat to 
representationalism. A similar case, which is also perfectly compatible with 
representationalism, is when one non-veridically experiences an object as 
being blurry (e.g., when a poorly sighted person experiences a clear object as 
being fuzzy, as if it really lacked specific edges). Allowing visual experience 
to be non-veridical, the representationalist has no problem with this case 
either. The intrinsic character of such experience would not be different 
from its veridical counterpart. Both cases involve experience that is fully 
described by its representational character.
The problematic case is when we do not experience an object as being 
blurry, but rather blurrily experience an object. A representationalist may 
insist that such a way of experiencing objects does not exist: this is Fred 
Dretske’s position (2003). Of course, no one denies that we do sometimes 
refer to visual experience itself as being blurred. However, on Dretske’s 
account, what we mean in such cases is that visual experience misrepresents 
objects as being fuzzy: it represents fuzziness where there is none. Blurred 
experience thus amounts to a kind of visual illusion. The object’s represented 
fuzziness, which does not really exist, is possibly due to some malfunction 
of the visual system, and therefore the description “blurred” is ascribed to 
the experience itself.
The difficulties with this account have been discussed by others.3 Denying 
that there is a way of seeing blurrily, or that seeing blurrily and seeing blurred 
do not intrinsically differ, is, at the very least, highly counterintuitive. As 
Smith says:
to the extent that I am experiencing blurred vision, it cannot seem to me that I am 
seeing a fuzzy object, since I cannot see the object well enough for any such feature 
to be apparent to me. Only to the extent that I see clearly do I visually represent, 
specifically, a fuzzy object. […]
[W]hen I see blurrily, I cannot see too well, I am unsure what is before me. This 
is not itself a matter of my theoretical judgment overriding the deliverances of my 
sense. It is not as though I realize that I am suffering from blurred vision, and so fail 
to be convinced by what I seem to see: the presence of a fuzzy object. The absolute 
basic, animal response to blurred vision is uncertainty about the nature of one’s 
surrounding. (2008, 203–204)
3 See, e.g., Smith (2008, 201–205); Pace (2007, 336ff.). 
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Smith discusses several more problems that arise in Dretske’s view.4 
More plausibly, then, a representationalist can try to account for blurred 
experience in terms of representational content. Arguably, a blurred 
experience has representational content with a certain structure. Following 
this line, even if the distinction between blurred and clear experiences 
is drawn by first making a reference to the phenomenal character of 
experience, at the end of the day the distinction can be captured in terms of 
representational content only.5 Recall that at the very minimum, to avoid a 
challenge to ST, what representationalists need to show is that experiencing 
blurrily does not involve variation in phenomenal character without a 
difference in representational content.
This is Tye’s response. It turns on the structure of representational content. 
Tye argues that in experiencing blurrily, “one’s visual experience […] makes 
no comment on where exactly the boundaries [of the object] lie” (2002, 
148). Of course, there are cases in which one clearly sees (or experiences) 
an object as being blurry, namely, as having inaccurate boundaries: in this 
case the experience says that there are no clear boundaries. But when one 
experiences blurrily, the experience has indeterminate representational 
content: it does not say where the boundaries are or what their nature is; it 
only says that they exist between spatial regions A and B.6 As Smith sums up 
this idea, the difference is “between a representation of indeterminacy and 
the indeterminacy of representation” (Smith 2008, 207).
Clearly, then, there is a difference in representational content, and in this 
way Tye’s reply seems to remove the difficulty for ST. To have blurry vision 
entails having representational content with a certain structure: unlike clear 
experience, it represents the world while “being silent” on the specificity of 
the edges. Other experiences, and specifically clear experiences of objects as 
being blurry, do not have this kind of representational structure.
4 See also Pace (2007).
5 See Tye (2002, 145–46).
6 Tye also argues that in experiencing blurrily, the experience tells one that the 
object’s boundaries fall between spatial regions A and B, but it is indefinite on exactly 
where between A and B the boundaries fall (2002, 149). But as Smith mentions (2008, 
206), this is also true of representing fuzziness. The difference in representational 
content is not with regard to where exactly the boundaries are, only with regard to 
whether the fuzziness is in the world: experience of blurriness represents the object 
as having no specific boundaries (i.e., as being fuzzy), whereas blurrily experiencing 
makes no comment on the boundaries’ specificity.
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I accept this structural account of blurry vision; nevertheless, I maintain 
that a consideration of blurry vision still entails conclusions which are 
incompatible with ST. Unlike what both defenders and opponents of 
representationalism assume, blurred experience is a counterexample to 
representationalism not because its phenomenological and representational 
properties are to be compared to those of clear experience – for Tye’s 
reply clearly shows that there is a difference in content between these two 
experiences (i.e., it should be allowed that blurred experience does indeed 
involve some loss of information when compared to experiencing clearly). 
The point about blurry vision is that the indeterminacy it involves allows, 
in each case, purely phenomenal changes. Once you are experiencing 
blurrily, certain changes in your blurred experience are possible while its 
representational content remains invariant: you will still experience blurrily, 
but your experience will be blurred in a different way, a way that cannot be 
captured in terms of content. This is true not only of blurred experience, but 
of other kinds of indeterminate experiences as well. I will now explain and 
defend this claim.
2. Experiences with Indeterminate Content
There is more than one way to see something blurrily. The differences 
between these ways, however, are not necessarily in representational content. 
Suppose you’re looking at a coin and see it clearly; you see it, for instance, as 
being specifically circular. Seeing a coin in this way is a typical case of clear 
experience; call this experience CE.
You then unfocus your eyes and start to see the coin blurrily: you do not 
experience the specific location of the edge, nor that the coin has a fuzzy 
edge; your experience is silent on where exactly the edge is located as well 
as on the edge’s degree of specificity. It says only that the edge is located 
between regions A and B. Suppose also that the phenomenal character of 
your experience includes, because of your blurred vision, a somewhat hazy 
area. Call this experience BE. I will argue that this phenomenal property – 
namely, the hazy aspect – can change in a certain way without changing BE’s 
representational content. Arguably, there has to be a specific aspect of this 
haziness that is nonrepresentational.
Compare BE to a different, falsidical experience, one that represents 
the coin as being fuzzy, namely, as having a proper fuzzy edge. In this 
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case you (nonveridically) experience the coin clearly: your experience 
“comments” that the coin’s edge is fuzzy. Call this experience EF. We 
can thus distinguish three experiences, CE, BE and EF, which differ from 
each other in representational content. Specifically, whereas BE’s haziness 
represents the edge without commenting on its specific location and nature, 
EF’s haziness represents the edge as being fuzzy. More specifically, suppose 
the phenomenal hazy area has a certain texture, say, a slightly coarse-grained 
one (the texture simply includes an array of small dots). Again, whereas BE’s 
hazy aspect represents the coin’s edge as merely located between regions A 
and B, EF, qua being a clear experience, represents the coin as having a 
fuzzy edge that has, in particular, a certain dotted texture, as the phenomenal 
haziness suggests (note that such a visual representation may be generated 
by simple graphic software).
If CE, BE and EF differ in representational content, how is BE a 
counterexample to ST? Recall that BE is just one blurred experience you 
may have. There can obviously be a similar blurred experience of the coin, 
one that has a hazy aspect with a different coarse-grained texture – one in 
which, say, the small dots are simply located differently (with no other 
phenomenal difference). Call this experience BE'. Much like BE, BE' is 
silent on the edge’s location. Both BE and BE' indeterminately represent 
the coin: they both seem to represent it as having its edge between areas A 
and B while being silent on the edge’s location or degree of specificity. Also, 
neither represents the coin as having one or the other dotted texture, for they 
differ precisely in this respect from the two correspondent clear experiences 
(those that represent the coin as having differently-dotted fuzzy boundaries, 
as the phenomenal difference between the arrays of dots suggests). Thus, 
BE and BE' have the same, indeterminate, content, whereas they differ 
phenomenologically.
The point of this example is not to show how tiny phenomenal changes 
might or might not be representationally significant. Clearly, minor changes 
in phenomenology can easily affect what visual experience represents (e.g., 
when viewed on the computer screen at slightly different pixel settings, a 
word might sometimes look completely different). The point here is that, 
since the phenomenology of BE is specific enough to represent the coin’s 
edge as having a dotted texture (as with EF), once your experience is blurred, 
hence silent on the edge’s nature and location, the specific array of dots is not 
representational anymore: it can change to some different texture without 
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changing the content. Thus, following Tye’s account, where the hazy area 
does not comment on the edge’s precise nature, there can be nothing in the 
difference between the phenomenal aspects of BE and BE' that entails a 
difference in their representational content.
Representationalists might still insist that necessarily, there is a 
representational difference between BE and BE'; for there is nothing in 
the logical relationship between determinables and determinates that rules 
out this necessity. Although BE and BE' are not different in representing 
determinates (since neither represents the edge’s specific location), they 
may nevertheless be different in representing determinables, and the 
representationalist can insist that they have to differ in this way. While BE, 
for instance, merely represents the edge as located between areas A and 
B, BE' may also represent the edge determinably – but as located between 
two different areas, A' and B'. Every phenomenal difference between two 
blurred experiences such as BE and BE' entails in this way a difference in 
content, which would be a difference between two determinables, namely, 
two differently nonspecific locations of the edge.
This formal reply, however, is undermined by examining BE/BE' more 
closely. What reason is there to argue that a difference in the array of dots 
entails a difference in the edge’s nonspecific location? The only premise was 
that the array of dots is arranged differently; hence, it can basically represent 
the same indeterminate content, despite the difference in the dots’ location: 
the dots’ location has simply no role in this experience. Moreover, given 
that the dots themselves do not represent any dots on the edge’s surface, at 
least some of them can change even to squares, diamonds, or other shapes 
that may thus induce a hazy texture with the same boundaries, thus they 
will still represent the same sparse content, namely, that the edge is located 
between areas A and B. Again, if the texture were fully representational (EF), 
it would represent a fuzzy edge covered with dots, squares, or diamonds, and 
the content would then be different. But once we assumed that BE merely 
represents the edge’s nonspecific location, the information embedded in the 
hazy aspect is sufficiently indeterminate to be embedded in other kinds of 
hazy aspects. In our example, a simple difference in the dots’ location does 
not involve new information with regard to the areas between which the 
edge exists.
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3. Other Examples
Without committing oneself to any thesis with regard to pictorial perception, 
the argument can be clarified by an analogy to viewing an indeterminate 
picture. Suppose, for the argument’s sake, that we can visually experience 
an object by looking at a picture of it. You are looking at a black-and-
white picture of, say, a garden (or, likewise, at a black-and-white television 
screen), and visually experience a garden. You do not experience the garden 
as having grey shades, nor as having any other specific hue; you experience 
the garden indeterminately, as merely having a hue (with a certain degree of 
brightness). The important point here is the structure of the indeterminate 
experience: the fact that you experience the garden indeterminately means 
that the picture’s hue could change to a different hue, for instance, to sepia, 
without necessarily changing any property that the garden is experienced as 
having. 
As with blurred experience, the idea is that once your experience 
represents something indeterminately, a certain aspect in its phenomenology 
can change without changing the representational content of your experience. 
Whether or not we really experience objects by looking at their picture, this 
case explains how indeterminacy is incompatible with ST: the indeterminacy 
of representational content entails that the state’s phenomenology is open to 
change without changing the content.
It would thus not be surprising that pure phenomenal differences is 
typical not only of blurry vision (or indeterminate pictorial experience – for 
intentionalists who accept that we experience pictured objects), but of other 
cases of indeterminate experience.
Here is another example. Suppose the above-mentioned clear experience 
of the coin (CE) is somehow distorted, so that the phenomenal circular 
aspect that represented the coin’s shape clearly becomes somewhat wiggly. 
The new experience’s phenomenology simply includes a certain “curve” 
that partly looks like, say, the tilde sign: ~. As with BE/EF, the case may 
involve two different experiences: First, you may start to experience the coin 
as having a wiggly, tilde-like edge, as if someone has actually distorted the 
coin’s shape. Alternatively, similar to what Tye says of blurred experience, 
such a distorted phenomenology can represent the coin indeterminately, 
namely, without having the experience say anything specific about the 
edge’s location. Call the latter experience DE.
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Much the same as BE’s hazy aspect does not represent a fuzzy, dotted 
edge, DE’s tilde-like aspect does not represent a tilde-like, twisted edge. 
Both experiences represent the coin’s boundaries merely as located 
between regions A and B. Indeed, I take it for granted that an indeterminate 
experience does not need to have a hazy phenomenal aspect, but may also 
be exemplified by other phenomenal aspects, such as this kind of distortion. 
Now if we compare DE either to CE or to clearly experiencing the coin 
as having a tilde-like edge, we have to admit that DE involves some loss 
of representational content. DE (like BE) differs in representational content 
from any determinate experience, because qua being indeterminate, DE does 
not represent the edge’s specific location or specificity.
But in order to see whether DE’s tilde-like phenomenal property is 
representational, DE should be compared to a differently distorted experience. 
Let DE' be identical to DE in all phenomenal aspects but one: it has DE’s 
mirrored tilde-like aspect. DE' also represents the coin indeterminately, 
namely, without commenting on the edge’s specificity and location. It may 
thus represent the coin with the same degree of indeterminacy as DE does. 
Yet the phenomenology of DE' includes a different distortion, namely, a 
reflected tilde. Thus, DE and DE' have the same representational content, 
although they differ in their phenomenal properties.
As with BE/BE', representationalists may respond that DE and DE' have to 
differ in content as well, since their tilde/reflected-tilde phenomenal aspects 
necessarily capture differently nonspecific areas. Yet this can hardly be the 
case: how can having the mirrored tilde-like aspect entail a difference in 
representational content? There is nothing in such a phenomenal difference 
that suggests that the regions between which the edge is located are A' and B' 
and not A and B. Suppose that when you have DE, or alternatively DE', you 
attend carefully to the representational content of experience, especially to 
the specificity and the location of the coin’s edge. Equipped with a sufficient 
conceptual repertoire, you actually form the beliefs about the edge’s location 
that can be drawn on the basis of your visual experience. You simply try as 
hard as possible to reveal the contents of your experience with regard to the 
edge’s nature. Is there any difference between the evidence provided by DE 
and DE' that might bring you to different conclusions in each case? Given 
that one experience includes a wiggly area, the reflected area cannot possibly 
contribute anything to your knowledge. More specifically, DE’s tilde-like 
phenomenology is determined by the fact that the actual edge is between 
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the tilde’s upper and lower limits. But this is true also of the mirrored tilde-
like aspect! Recall that in both experiences the specific curve-ness does not 
represent the edge’s curve (only that its boundaries are between two areas); 
hence, the phenomenal aspects of DE and DE', although different, cannot be 
said to denote any difference in information. In both cases we experience the 
coin in the same indeterminate manner.
Distorted, blurred, and probably other forms of indeterminate experience 
are all counterexamples to ST for the same reason: they can all be compared 
to a possible, differently indeterminate experience, one that differs in 
phenomenal character but not in representational content. Obviously, in 
experiences of indeterminacy, e.g., EF, the phenomenal aspects – the hazy or 
wiggly areas – are representational, as they are determined by a difference in 
content which is the difference between the represented properties of having 
either one or the other coarse-grained texture, and likewise, either a tilde-
like edge or the mirrored-tilde one. Yet BE and DE, contrary to EF, can 
change in their phenomenal character, since they represent merely “rough,” 
indeterminate properties.
4. Generalization
What special characteristic does indeterminate experience have that 
makes it different from determinate experience with respect to ST? 
The answer is probably that one is indeterminate and the other is not. But 
recall that simply being indeterminate in the sense of not representing 
determinate properties is true also of clear experience of an object as being 
fuzzy. The modification (suggested by Tye) was that such experiences 
represent in an indeterminate manner because they are silent on the edges’ 
locations and specificities, whereas clear experience is not (i.e., it represents 
the degree of indeterminacy, and therefore it is not indeterminate experience 
per se).
But this modification is still insufficient. For being indeterminate is 
always relative to a given degree of determinacy. In general, the relation 
between determinables and determinates holds between more than two 
levels of a set of properties. For instance, “red” is a determinate of “color,” 
but it is a determinable of “red-27”; likewise, “round” is a determinate of 
“shape,” but a determinable of “ellipse.” In the same way, every experience 
is indeterminate with regard to some other experience: if you looked at a 
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coin through a magnifying glass or microscope, you would quickly conclude 
that your “ordinary” experience of it is indeterminate – because it doesn’t 
comment on the more precise location of the edge, which is revealed by 
the other, clearer experience. Nevertheless, you typically won’t regard your 
ordinary experience as indeterminate in the above sense: your ordinary, 
everyday experience is certainly not blurred, and cannot be used as a 
counterexample to ST just because you can have clearer experience.
Thus, it is, specifically, indeterminacy with a certain structure due to which 
ST is refuted. Some, but not all, experiences have a certain characteristic 
that makes them indeterminate with regard to other experiences in a special 
sense. If this special sense cannot be found in how experiences represent the 
world (again, because most or all everyday experiences represent the world 
indeterminately with regard to some other experiences), we should look for 
this aspect at the phenomenal level.
The special sense in question can be easily identified by consideration 
of the above examples. I argued that blurred or distorted experiences are 
different from other experiences that are possibly blurred or distorted in 
phenomenal aspects only. The presence of such an aspect is what constitutes 
their indeterminacy: without it, the experience would be clear, or fully 
determinate in the above sense. Indeterminacy here simply follows from 
having a phenomenal, nonrepresentational (or nonintentional) property. In 
general, a phenomenal property P of visual experience E is nonrepresentational 
(or nonintentional) just in case there can be visual experience E' that does not 
differ from E in representational content, yet differs from it in not having P. 
E is then either blurred, distorted or, generally, indeterminate (i.e., in the 
above sense).7 Its indeterminacy follows from the fact that it has P.
Obviously, there can also be experience in which P is representational 
(e.g., when we experience the object as having what P represents, as 
with EF); such experience would be determinate in this sense, because 
it clearly represents indeterminacy. The intrinsic structure of blurred or 
distorted experience thus guarantees its unique sort of indeterminacy: it 
is indeterminate because it does not specify what a fully representational 
experience – an experience in which P is representational – would specify.
7 The internal differences between blurred and distorted experience are probably 
based on the nature of P: a hazy aspect constitutes blurred experience, a wiggly 
aspect a distorted one, and so on. 
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Note that in pointing to the phenomenal level of visual experience, I 
am not denying that there might also be a higher-order cognitive process, 
external to visual experience, which is part of what makes experience 
indeterminate. Perhaps even a certain belief about the way one perceives 
the world is necessary in order to be capable of experiencing things blurrily, 
perhaps not. It might be that one has to realize that with regard to one’s 
everyday perceptual capability, one’s current experience is indeterminate, 
and only in this way can a phenomenal property P be constituted. This would 
be strange, but not incompatible with my account. My point is that even 
if there is such a cognitive, non-experiential process, there has also to be 
an intrinsic, phenomenal characteristic of experience that constitutes the 
indeterminacy at issue. There is simply no consideration external to visual 
experience that by itself makes experience blurred, distorted, and so on.
As with the above examples, this generalization is incompatible with 
ST. Indeed, if ST were true, we would face two extreme options: either 
(1) no indeterminate experience per se is possible (i.e., only the experience 
of indeterminacy – namely, fuzziness – is possible); or (2) all possible 
experiences are indeterminate (i.e., given that “indeterminate experience” 
means being silent on what some other, clearer experience specifies). 
The account here, much like Tye’s account, rejects option (1), but shows 
that there is a subset of experiences that are indeterminate in a special 
sense. These experiences do not specify what we expect other – perhaps all – 
of our experiences to specify: they do not specify what their “loose,” P-like, 
phenomenal property could represent. Once all their phenomenal properties 
become representational, they would become clear, “normal” experiences, 
and their indeterminacy would amount only to the sense suggested in 
option (2).
On this account there has to be a phenomenal difference between clear 
and blurred experience, since having a phenomenal nonrepresentational 
property is constitutive of indeterminacy. This might seem too strong. Tye, 
for instance, asks whether there is any inherent phenomenal difference 
“between the states of seeing a clear thing blurrily and seeing a blurry thing 
clearly” (2002, 148). He replies that although some blurred experiences are 
phenomenally different from their experiences-of-blurriness counterparts, 
“an experimental set-up could be devised that would leave one without any 
way of telling from the phenomenal character of one’s visual experience … 
whether one had shifted from seeing a sharp screen image through a blur to 
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seeing clearly a suitable blurred version of that same screen image in at least 
some cases” (ibid.).
Tye does not go on to explain this set up. I think, first, that the case of 
seeing images, or seeing things through a blur, and likewise “seeing” through 
pictorial representations, is complicated enough, requires its own theory, 
and cannot straightforwardly be considered as a counterexample to the 
suggested account. Without going into details, the fact that we can visually 
experience an image or a picture itself, and alternatively experience what 
is in the image or what the picture represents, makes this case problematic 
enough to offer us an example of what Tye gestures towards in his thought-
experiment.8 Second, even if Tye’s claim was intended to be generalized to 
ordinary cases, all he says is that sometimes one cannot tell whether one has 
shifted from experiencing blurrily to experiencing clearly. This by itself is 
not incompatible with having a nonrepresentational phenomenal property. 
Arguably, one can have indeterminate experience, namely, experience with 
a certain phenomenal property that is not determined by what the experience 
represents and is therefore nonrepresentational, yet without being aware of 
this fact.
One thing is clear: when we recognize that we experience blurrily, it is 
not, or not merely, by way of comparing it to more precise, determinate 
experiences; it is rather by noticing an intrinsic feature of experience. The 
account of blurriness suggested by Tye forces us, at the end of the day, to 
give up ST. The “loss of information” that is typical to blurred experience 
on such an account does not result in us experiencing less information than 
what is embedded in clear experience, but delves deep into the structure 
of experience, leaving some of its phenomenal aspects undetermined by 
representational content.
5. Conclusion
Tye’s account of blurred experience as neither an illusion nor a partly-
nonrepresentational experience was probably motivated by the desire to 
preserve the tenet that – in sense experience – the world appears as being 
8 Seeing something through a picture might be interpreted, e.g., according to Ken 
Walton’s theory of transparent pictures, on which we actually see things through 
binoculars, televisions, as well as photographs (Walton 1984; cf. Zemach 1999 and 
Newall 2009).
42   Alon Chasid
open to, or in direct contact with, the perceiver. Tye tried to show that 
this is true even in the case of seeing blurrily. I showed, however, that his 
account of blurry vision is inadequate. Although Tye describes correctly the 
phenomenon of blurred experience, it still involves the purely phenomenal 
haziness or distortion that Tye attempts to remove.
Bar-Ilan University
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